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The  Community  has  supported  food  strategies  since )981, .particularly 
in  Mali,  Kenya,  Rwanda  and  Zambia. 
Food  strategies  were  conceived  mainly  as  a  reaction  to  the deteriorating 
food  security  situation  in  many  parts of  the  world,  but  especially  in 
Africa.  Up  to  now  Food  strategies  have  been  largely  concerned  with  the 
following  issues  : 
•  farmers  production  incentives 
•  marketing  organization,  infrastructure,  role  of  public 
marketing  agencies 
agricultural  support  services  (research,  extension,  inputs). 
An  examination  of  the  experience  with  food  strategies  must  bear  in  mind 
the  structural  nature  of  food  issues  and  the  short  time  period  that  has  elapsed 
since  the  approach  was  started.  Still, experience  in  the  above  mentioned 
countries  reveals  improvements  in  several  areas,  but  also  some  points  that 
so  far  received  insufficient  attention  <nutrition,  vulnerable  groups,  role 
of  women  as  food  producers,  non-cereals  crops,  livestock,  fisheries  and  data 
availability and  quality). 
The  Communityrs  experience  in  supporting  food  strategies  shows  how  diverse 
cooperation  instruments  have  been  fruitfully  integrated  in  food  strategy 
exercices.  This  is  particularly  important  because,  with  respect  to agricultural 
cooperation,  the  new  Lome  convention  makes  it possible  to  extend  the  food 
strategy approach  to  other  ACP  countries  that  wish  so. 
This  provides  an  opportunity  for  the  Community  and  its Members  States  to 
generalize  the  experience  acquired  in  the  four  countries  mentioned  above  in 
view  of  better  serving  the  objective  of  food  iecurity  in  the  world. 
With  respect  to organization  of  the  paper  it  is  important  to  mention  that 
the  main  text  refers  to  specific  countries  only  as  illustration and.concen-
trates  on  the  possibilities  to  increase  the  effectiveness  of  food  strategies 
as  well  as  the  possible  role  of  the  Community  in  ~his respect. 
The  annexes  summarize  achievements  at  the  country  level. C 0  N  T  E N  T  S 
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Annexes  on  Mali,  Kenya,  Rwanda,  Zambia  and  Tanzania. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
During  the first  two  decades  after the  second  world  war,  Third  World 
development  efforts  focused  on  industry  and  infrastructure,  the ·premis~ 
.  . 
being  that  substantial  manpower  could  be  released  from  the agricultural 
sector  without  diminishing  agricultural  producti6n.  Thus,  develop~ent 
l  'd  ff  t  d  rh·  d  W  ld  l"  .  dl·a·  ;sufficiently  p  ans,  a1  e  or s  an  1r  or  government  po  1c1es  not  encourage 
agriculture at  a  time  when  increased  population growth  was  Leading  to  a 
sharp  rise  in  food  demand. 
In the  beginning  of  the  seventies  a  number  of  coincidences  including 
adverse  weather  conditions  in many  parts of  the  world  and  the  arrival of 
the  Soviet  Union  as  the  Largest  buyer  on  the  world  cereal's  market  demon-
strated dramatically  how  fragile  the  food  situation was.  In  1973-74  food 
prices  on  the  world  market  more  than  doubled  and  famines  resulted  in the 
Sahel,  Ethiopia  and  Bangladesh.  At  the  same  time  the  Less  Developed 
Countries  CLDCs)  faced  increased  energy  and  fertilizer bills,  maki~g 
it difficult  for  them  to  buy  food  on  the  world  ~arket without  serious 
balance of  payments  problems. 
Third  World  governments  and  aid agencies  (including  the  EEC)  reacted 
by  shifting their development  focus  towards  agriculture -and by  signifi-
cantly  increasing  food  aid efforts. 
This  reorientation  brought  some  positive  results  - between  1975  and  1980 
no  major  famine  occurred.  Price  tensions  in  the Morld  food  market  dimi-
nished.  Nevertheless,  the  absolute  number  of  undernourished  people 
continued  to  rise  because  fundamental  trends  in  food  productiqn,  yields, 
consu~tion and  imports  did  not  chan~e,  nor  did'nopulation  g~o~fh.  tlearly 
addltional  ahd  different  efforts  were  needed  to  improve  the  world  food 
situation. 
* 
*  * 2. 
In  reaction  to  the  state of  affairs outlined above  the  European 
Parliament  has,  during  1980,  held  a  special  debate  and  organized  hea-
rings  on  world  food  issues.  Following  these debates,  in  1981  .E.C • 
.  · 
Commissioner  Pisani  has  Launched  a  Plan  to  Combat  World  Hunger.  A cen-
tral part  of  that  plan  consists of  support  t~ the  formulation  and  im-
plementation of  food  strategies  in  a  number  of  countries. 
The  Community  has  actively supported  food  strategies in  four  countries  : 
Mali,  Kenya,  Zambia  and  Rwanda.  This  paper  deals  with  what  has  thus  far 
_been  the  experience  in  these  countries.  One  must  realize,  however~  that 
three  years  is extremely  short,  given  the  structural  nature  of  food  issues. 
In  fact,  discussions  on  food  strategies  ir. the  countries  concerned  started 
during  the  course  of  1982  and  concrete  measures  only  got  underway  in  1983. 
It  i~  therefore  too  early for  a  comprehensive  evaluation.  In  particular 
it is  too early to  make  a  quantitative analysis  of  the  effects  of  food 
strategies  on  the  macro-food  variables  such  as  production  and  imports. 
Still,  in  view  of ensuring  maximum  effectiveness of  the  food  strategy 
efforts,  it  is  important  to  examine  already  the  main  strengths and 
weaknesses  of  the  approach  so  that  modifications,  if deemed  necessary, 
can  be  envisaged*. 
*This  note  draws  heavily  on  the  views  of  all  those  that  have  been  involved 
in  the  implementation of  food  strategies.  Extensive  use  has  also  been 
made  of  two  reports  that  were  recently. completed. at  the  reque~t of  the 
Commission  :  "Food  Strategies  in  Four  African  Countries"  by  the  Royal 
Tropical  Institute  (K.I.T.)  in  Amsterdam  (completed  in  January  1984) 
and  "African  Food  Strategies  and  the  EC's  Role  :  An  Interim  Review" 
by  the  Institute of  Development  Studies  (I.D~S.)  in  Brighton  (completed 
in  July  1984>. 3. 
2.  BASIC  CONSIDERATIONS  THAT  LED  TO  THE  FOOD  STRATEGY  APPROACH 
The  basic  considerations  leading  to  the  food  strategies  approach  as  a 
reaction  to  the  continuing  deterioration  of  the  food  situation  in' many 
developing  countries  despite  increased  allocation  of  development  cooperation 
funds  towards  agriculture  and  food  can  be  briefly summarized  as  follows  : 
•  The  chances  for  succe$of  projects are  much  greater if they  are 
conceived  within  a  unified  framework.Such  a  framework  can  be  provided 
in  the  context  of  food  strategies. 
If projects  <or  even  programmes)  are  to  be  viable  in  the  Long  run  and 
are  to  become  self~supporting, an  appropriate policy environment  must 
be  present.  One  of  the  purposes  of  a  food  strategy is  to define  the 
most  suitable  policy environment. 
Of  course,  it must  be  stressed that  food  strategies are  no  substitute 
for  projects,  but  rather  complementary. 
Given  the  fact  that  food  expenditures  in many  of  th~  le~st develbped 
countries  account  for  more  than  fifty percent  of total  consumption 
expenditures  and  that  agricultural employment  often  accounts  for 
eighty  percent  of  total  employment.  food issues  are  clearly 
imoortant  macroeconomic  issues  in  such  countries.  Food  strategies 
recognize  the  macroeconomic  nature  of  food  issues. 
From  the  donor's  point  of  view  an  assistance  to  policies  rather  than 
the  more  usual  policy  of  assistance  is  needed  in .many  LDCs.  Fo6d  stra-
tegies  are  a  way  to assist  countries  with  the  formulation  and  excution 
of  policies  in  the  area  of  food • 
. 3.  MAIN  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  CURRENT  FOOD  STRATEGY  EFFORTS 
When  one  compares  the  efforts to  set  up  and  implement  food  strateg1es 
in  the  four  countries  dealt  with  ,  it is  striking that,  even 
though  basic  conditions  in  these  countries  are  quite different,  many 
common  elements  are present.  This  section examines  the similarities in 
objectives  and  policy  interventions  considered  in  the  four  food  stra-
tegies. 
. I. 4. 
The  most  important  objective  mentioned  in  official 
food  strategy  documents  is  national  food 
security,  to be  achieved  via greater  food  self-sufficiency.  This' objec-
tive of  food  independance  generally  concerns  "preferred  cereals"  : 
wheat,  maize  and  rice,  though  Kenyan  and  Rwandan  strategies  mention 
other  food  products.  Food  self-sufficiency is ususally  considered only 
at the national  level,  however,  K~nya wants  this objective to  be  rea-
ched  at  the  sub-regional  Level  as  well. 
The  achievement  of  adequate  nutrition  levels  is a  second  objective 
df  food  strategies.  However,  this  objective is often defined  in 
general  terms,  and  the  nutritional  status of  pa~ticular population 
groups  has  not  recEived  sufficient  attention  in  the  current  food 
strategy efforts. 
A number  of  traditional objectives of  agricultural  development  policy 
also figure  more  or  less  explicitely in  food  strategy documents.  These 
apply  to diversification  and  intensification of  the  agricultu~al sector 
as  well  as  to agricultural  exports.Diversification and  exports  are 
mentioned  as  food  st~ategy objectives  by  Za~bia,  Kenya  and  Mali.  Inten-
sification is particularly  stressed  in the  case  of  Rwanda. 
In  virtually all discussions  on  implementing  food  strategies,motivating 
farmers  to  produce  has  been  a  central  idea.  M.otivation  to  produce  is 
closely  related to price  incentives.  Farm  gate  prices  of  agricultural 
products  need  to  be  sufficiently high  to  compensate  for  the  production 
efforts.  At  the  same  time  consumption  goods  and  farm  inputs  s~ould be 
available at  a  sufficiently  low  price. 
During  the past  five  years  a  consensus  has  emerged  about  the  fact  that 
prevailing prices did  not  encourage  food  production  in  Africa.  In.  many 
countries  of  Sub-Saharan  Africaapolicy has  been  pursued during  the 
sixties and  most  of  the  seventies,  using  various  instruments~to main-
tain  low  food  prices  in  the  cities.  Restoring  producers'  incentives 
. I. 5. 
through  increases  in  farm  gate  prices  has  been  an  important  element 
in  food  strategies. 
As  an  example,  in  the  case  of  Mali,  the  government  together  with  a 
Large  number  of donors,  including  the  EEC  and  several  of  its Member 
States  has  reached  agreement  on  a  policy of  restructurin9  the  cereals 
market.  Its ma.in  focus  is  on  increasing  the prices  received  by 
farmers.  At  the  same  time  food  aid  is 
supplied  to  prevent  urban  food  prices  from  rising drastically.  The 
revenue  from  the  sale  of  food  aid  allows  to-increase  the  producer 
prices.  As  the  marketable  surplus  of  farmers  increases  food  aid  can 
be  diminished  gradually. 
In  Zambia,  a  very  sizeable  increase of  producer  prices  for  the main 
crops  has  been  put  in effect  in  recent  years.  Interestingly,  the  price 
increases  announced  for  the  84/85  crop  season  are  more  pronounced  for 
millet,  sorghum  and  cassava  than  for  maize.  This  provides  an  extra 
stimulus  for  the  production  of  crops  consumed  mainly  by  Low  income 
groups.  The  problem  of  price differences  throughout this  country  is 
also  very  important.  Given  th~ size of·the  country,  it is  costly to 
maintain  a  unique  nationwide  producer and/or  consumer  price.  Howeve·r, 
up  to  now  the  government  has  attempted to  keep a  uniform  price 
for  major  commodities  such  as  maize.  This  has  substantially increased 
the operating  costs  of  the  cereals  marketing  board  and  it  has  also pre-
vented  regional  specialization  according  to  comparative  advantage. 
The  food  strategy proposals  suggest  to  let  regional  price  differences 
depend  on  cost  differences. 
The  issue of  food  subsidies  is  closely  related to price policy.  In 
countries  with  a  strong  non-agricultural  se~tor and  a  well  organized 
labour  force  (e.g.Zambia),  food  subsidies  have  often  been  a  sizeable real 
income  component  for  the  urban  population.  When  the  cost  of  imported 
goods  rises  and  when  at  the  same  time  the  price of  exports  falls,  such 
subsidies  become  a  heavy  burden  for  the government  budget.  It  is  not 
easy  to devise policies that  Limit  the  cost  of  food.subsidies  without 
causing  severe  inflation that  undermines_the  urban  purchasing  power 
and  causes  hardship  for  the  vulnerable  population groups.  The  conse-
quences  faced  by  countries  that  attempted drastic  changes  in this area 
.I. 6. 
Ce.g.  Egypt,  Tunisia,  Morocco,  Sri  Lanka)  are  well-known.  Thus  on~ 
can  see the  importance  of  a  "balanced· and  progressive  approach" 
as  advocated  in  food  strategies. 
3.3.  ~a_!:,k!_t_j_n_g_  ~r_g_a!:!_i~a.!_i.£_n_i!:!_f_!:,a~t_!:,U_£t~_r!_ !_n~ .!_h!_  _!:.O.l_e_o..!,  .e_u£L.::!_c 
.!!!.a_!:.k!_t.2_n_g_!_g!_n_£i!_s 
Changing  the  government's  price  policies  and  subsidies  will  not  by  itself 
be  sufficient  to  make  agriculture  a  rewarding  economic  venture,  sin~e 
'• 
prices at  the  farm  gate  Level  are  low,  not  only as  a  consequence of 
price policy,  but  also as  a  result  of  inadequate  marketing  organiza-
tion and  infrastructure,  for  inputs  as  well  as  well  as  for  farm  output. 
Even  when  the  government  does  not  directly  intervene  in  food  markets, 
there.will  be  a  sizeable difference  between  the  retail  prices  in  the 
urban  areas  and  farm  gate prices.  Transport,  processing  ,  storage and 
other trade  services  account  for  this  difference.  With  respect  to  the 
efficiency of  marketing,  both  the  "software"  (organizational  and  mana-. 
gemen~  capacity)  as  well  as  tf-te  "hardware"  (adequate  roads,  wareho:..Jses 
etc.) are  important.  The  issue  of  marketing  efficiency  has  figured  ~ro­
minently  in  the  Kenyan  food  strategy discussions. 
Closely  related  to  marketing  organization and  infrastructure  is  the. 
role of  public  marketing  organizations.  Such  organizationshave  an 
important  role  to  play  in  regulating  markets  such  as  to  avoid 
excessive  price movements.  Large  publicly  controlled marketing 
insti.tutions operate  in  Kenya,  Mali  and  Zambia.  Accordingly, 
several  measures  of  the  food  strategies  relate  to  the goal  of 
improving  the  performance  of  these  public  marketing  bodies. 
Another  set  of  policies  common  to all  ~our food  strategies,  but  par-
ticularly emphasized  in  the  case of  Rwanda,  could  be  termed  :.  agri-
cultural  support  services.  Such  services  include agricultural  research 
and  extension as  well  as  the  provision of  modern  farm  inputs  and  credit· 
facilities. 
.1. 7. 
Agricultural  research  facilities are often poorly equipped  and  face 
shortages  of  qualified staff.  It  is  now  generally  known  that  research 
has  focused  on  cash-crops  and  neglected  important  subsistence  crops. 
However,  it. is  Less  widely  known  that  the  foregone  yield  improvements 
may  have  r:onsiderable  nutritional  effects.  The  flow  of  information 
bE:to..:en  existil1\:l  int~:r11ational  a11ci.  national  ayricultural  research· 
organizations  is inadequate;  moreover,  neither type  of  organization 
has  sufficiently directed its  research  in the  specific  framework  of 
existing  farming  systems. 
Similar  oroblems  exist  with  respect  to  agricultural  extension  and 
the  provision of  new  inputs.  Extension  services  also  suffer  from 
poor  organization  and  lack  of  qualified staff.  As  with  research,  the 
extension  package  that  is offered does  not  always  fit  into  the  existing 
farming  system. 
With  respect  to  farm  credit  H,e  food  strategies contain  a  number  of 
reorientations.  Up  to  now  formal  credit provided  by  develop-
ment  banks  or  similar  institutions  has  only  to  a  very  Limited  extent 
been  used  for  basic  food  crops.  In  Mali  a  ~ooperative credit  scheme 
is  being  attempted.  This  has  the  advantage  of  involving  farmers  much 
more  closely and  may  also  increase mobilization of  rural  savings. 
Most  of  the agricultural  support  measures listedabove  have  always 
figured  prominently  in  agricultural  development  plans.  The  food 
strategy  focus  is  to  improve  the  coherence  of  these  different 
measures  as  well  as  to prioritize  them  in  view  ~f these  adequate 
nutrition  anrl  food  security objectives. 8. 
4.  POSSIBILITIES  TO  INCREASE  THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  FOOD  STRATEGIES 
Notwithstanding  important  achievements  (  see  annexes  )  there  remain  ways 
to  increase  the  effectiveness of  food  strategies.  They  can 
be  grouped  in three  main  areas  :  Fi rst,there  is  the  issue  of  food  con-
sumption  and  the  proble~of nutrition  and  vulnerable  groups  that  are 
directly  Linked  to  this.  Current  food  strategies  have  paid  relatively 
Little attention to  food  demand  aspects. 
Second,  with  respect  to  production,  improvements  can  be  made  by  giving 
more  attention to  non-cereals  crops  as  well  as  to  Livestock  and  fishe-
ries.  The  position  of  women  as  agricultural  producers  could  be  improv~d 
and  farmers  organizations  could  be  more  involved  in  food  strategies. 
Also  the  policy  package  that  is  designed  to  increase agricultural  pro-
duction  should  be  better-balanced. 
The  third area  concerns  the  need  to  Link  food  strategy  efforts to 
the  problemsof  population  and  environmental  degradation.  In  this 
connection  regional  coordination  problems  must  also  be  dealt  with. 
Besides  these  issues,  there  is  the  related  issue  of  data  availability that 
has  to do  with  all  the  above  me0tioned  areas. 
4.1.  _£o~s~m.E_tj_o~ ~n~  ~uJ:_n~r~bJ:_e_g.!:.o~~ 
The  current  food  strategy efforts  pay  relatively  little attention  to  the 
consumrtion  side.  Related  to  this,  there  is  also  Lack  of  emphasis  on  nutri-
tional  issues  and  on  vulnerable  groups.Given  sociocultural  factors that 
determine  tastes,  consumption  depends 
mainly on  purchasing  power.  Therefore,  in order  to  increase  food  consump-
tion one  must  either diminish  food  prices  or  one  must  increase  income. 
Diminishing  food  prices  thro~gh general  subsidies is normally  a  very 
costly procedure  that  probably  can~not be  sustained  by  the  government 
Ccfr.  the  references  made  earlier to  za~~ia,  Sri  Lanka,  Egypt,  Morocco 
and  Tunisia).  With  respect  to  increasing  income,  one  must  first  know 
the  different  income  components  of  the  population  groups  that  one  wishes 
to  help· 
~oughly speaking,  there  will  be  two  major  components  :  revenue  from 
selling  lahour  (i.e.  wages)  and  revenue  from  selling  produced  commo-
dities.  Therefore,  in  order  to  stimulate  food  soncumption  one  must  support 
. I. 9. 
income  generating  activities  for  the  rural  and  ucban  poor.  To  the  extent 
that  food  nroduction  in  rural  areas  is  the  most  important  income  generating 
activity there  is  a  strong  comnlementarity  between  supporting  productic:n 
and  strenghtening  consumption.  However,  one  should  not  ~eglect other 
important  income  sources  such  as  non-food  cash  crops,  forestry,  handi-
crafts,  processing  of  farm  commodities,  repair of  farm  implements,  ho~se 
construction etc.  •  Focussing  al~o on .consumption through  income  generating 
activiti~s may  thus  broaden  the  scop~ of  actions  to  support  food  strategies. 
Particularly  in  densely  populated  countries  such  as  Rwanda  and  to  some 
extent  Kenya  it  is  very  important  to  encourage  rural  non-agricultural 
activities  as  a  source  of  Livelihood.  This  is  already done  in  the  Rwanda 
food  strategy. 
Related  to  consumption  issues  is  attention  for  nutritionally vulnerable 
groups.  The  K.I.T.  report  considers  the  lack  of  attention  for  vulnerable 
groups  (e.g.  small  children  ,  Lactating  and  pregnant  women)  as  a  short-
coming  of  current  food  strategy efforts.  More  could  be  done  in this  res-
pect  even  though  there  are  some  pitfalls that  one  should  be  aware  of. 
If  vulnerable  groups  are  broadly  defined it will  be  extremely  costly to 
set  up  programmes  to  support  the~.  On  the  other  hand  if vulnerable  groups 
are  defined  in  a  narrow  way,  it  may  be  difficult  and  costly to  reach  themand 
special  efforts  may  naturally end  up  partly  with  less  vulnerable  groups. 
In  view  of this  the  best  approach  could  be  to  de,vise 'self  targeting"  in-
terventions.  An  example  may  clarify this.  In  Bangladesh  an  experiment 
was  carried out  to  provide  sorghum  food  aid.  Coarse  grains  such 
as  sorghum  are  not  normally  consumed  by  pe~ple who  can  afford  rice. 
Also  food  for  work  projects  may  be  self targeting  :  only  those  who  have 
no  alternative will  enroll.  This  argument  should  be  taken  into account 
in  the  evaluation of  food  for  work  projects.  Of  course  many  other  con-
siderations  enter the picture  in  order  to decide  on  food  for  work  or more 
generally  on  labour  intensive  rural  works  programmes. 
With  respect  to  vulnerable  groups,  it is  important  not  to  restrict ac-
tion  to  food,  but  also  to  take  ~nto account  other  basic  needs  such .as  : 
health,  sanitation,  drinking  water  and  education.  Actions  in  th~  areas 
of  nutrition,  health  and  education  generally  will  be  mutually  reenfor-
cing.  The  nutritional  centers  for  Lactating  and  pregnant,women  and  for 
small  cnildren  that  exist  already  in  Rwanda  could  be  strenghtened  in  this 
direction. 
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As  mentioned  before  in  connection  with  the objectives of  the  food 
strategies  there  is a  bias  in attention towards  the  "preferred cereals" 
rice,  wheat  and  maize.  There  are  a  number.  of. arguments  in  favour  of  other 
food  crops  such  as  sorghum,  millet,  cassave1·sweet  potatoes  and  pulses. 
The  latter crops  are generally  consumed  more  intensively  by  low  income 
households  so  that  their availability at  low.prices  is  in  the  interest 
of equity.  Also,  from  the  point  of  view  of  nutritional  content  these  crops 
are  often  superior  to  preferred  cereals.  Moreover,  they are  usually 
more  resistant  to  drought  and  plant  diseases. 
Livestock  and  fishery  products also  received  relatively little attention 
in  food  strategy efforts.  At  first  sight  one. could  think  that  animal  pro-
ducts  are "Luxury  items"  that  should  not  be  encouraged  in  a  strategy  to  com-
bat  hunger.However,  one  must  also  consider  that  in  many  cases  livestock  and 
fishery  products  are produced  by  specific  socio-economic  population  clas-
ses  for  which  such  products  constitute the main  sources  of  Livelihood. 
Such  population  groups  must  exchange  their animal  products  for  cereals, 
oils and  non-agricultural  necessities.  A well-balanced  food  strategy  should 
take  into  account  the  interest  of  these population  classes.  Also  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Long  term ecological  balance it is necessary  to  fully 
integrate  livestock  and  fisheries  in  a  food  strategy.  Furthermore  t~ere 
are  important  Linkages  between  the  Livestock  and  crops  sectors  :e.g. 
if certain  types  of  animal  diseases  could  be  succesfully treated,  animals 
could  provide  more  draft  power  and  manure,  so  that  crop  yields  can  rise. 
Such  linkages  remain  underexploited  in  many  African  countries. 
The  above  remarks  on  other  crops  and  animal  products  should  not  be. inter-
preted  to  mean  that  all  food  strategi~s should  focus  on  the  full  range 
of  agricultural  production.  Priorities  should  be  established  in  view  of 
the  basic  food  strategy objectives.  The  stress on  preferred  cereals  should 
be  viewed  in this  Light. 
The  food  strategy efforts  in  the  four  countries  reviewed  here  pay  only 
Little attention to  the  role  of  women  "' agricultural  production.  Never-
theless  it is  well  known  that  the  current  division of  labour  in  African 
agriculture allocates  major  responsibility for  food  crop  cultivation to 
women.  Men  are  more  intensively occupied  in  land  clearing,  cash-crops 
and  rural  non-farm  activities. 
The  issues  related  to  woman's  role  in  food  production· are  complex  and  one 
must  refrain  from  quick  generalizations.  However,  some  suggestions  can 
be  made  in  the  context  of  food  strategy objectives.  There  is  a  strong 
argument  in  favour  of  Lifting any  possible  restrictions  on  the  procure-
ment  of  credit  by  women.  It  is  very  Likely  that  women  will  allocate  ./. 11 • 
credit  obtained  towards  increasing  food  production.  It  is  also  neces-
sary  to  involve  women  as  much  as  possible  in  the dissemination  of  tech-
nical  know-how  related  to  food  production.  Actions  designed  to  Lift 
time  constraints  for  women  e.g.  by  improved  water  and  firewood  supply 
and  through  better  cooking  stoves  could  increase their efficiency  as 
food  producers.(The  Special  Programme,  art.958  contains  some  actions  in  this 
area).  . 
Up  to  now  farmers  organizations  have  not  been  very  much  involved  in 
the  formulation  and  execution of  food  strategies.  This  became  clear 
at  a  recent  meeting  in  Brussels  between  representatives  from  Euro-
pean  farmers  organizations  <COPA/COGECA>  and  representatives  from 
farmers  organizations  in  Mali,  Kenya,  Zambia  and  Rwanda. 
There  seem  to  be  three  areas  where  involvement  of  farmers  organizations 
may  be  very  beneficial 
•  they  may  be  helpful  in  obtaining,  in  a  relatively  cheap  way,  farm 
Level  dat~;  such  data  especially on  the  use  of  farm  inputs,  both 
marketed  and  unmarketed,  as  well  as  on  farm  gate  prices  are  impor-
tant  to  evaluate  price  policy  measures; 
farmers  organizations  may  be  very  helpful  to mobilize  rura~  resources 
and  to  motivate  farmers  in  view  of  food  strategy objectives; 
•  cooperative  farmers  organizations  can  also  play  a  very  important 
role  with  respect  to marketing  output  and  supplying  inputs. 
In  attempting  to  involve  farmers  organizations  one  must  remember  that 
farmers  are  important  actors,  but  not  the  only actors  in  a  food  strategy. 
The  interests of  rural  non-farmers  and  in  some  countries  landless  farm 
workers  must  also  be  taken  into account. 
Towards  a  balanced  policy  package 
The  description  in  section 3  of  the  main  characteristics of  current  food 
strategy efforts outlined  three  broad  areas  in  which  policy  changes  are 
important  :  incentives  for  the  farmer  to  ~roduce by  ensuring  adequate 
prices  for  farm  output  and  input,  marketing  organization and  infrastruc-
ture  and  provision of agricultural  support  services  (research,  extension, 
credit).  Food  strategies  have  tended  to  emphasize  one  or  two  of  these 
areas,  but  it is necessary  that  efforts are  made  in all  three  areas  simul-
taneously  and  in  a  coordinated  way  to  improve  the  food  situation.  Price 
policies or marketing  reform  or  agricultural  services  separately will 
not  be  sufficient.  A diversified  and  balanced  policy  package  is  required • 
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Population  issues 
At  its current  growth  rate,  Kenya's  population  will  double  in  less  than  20 
"'  years.  To  improve  the  quality of  the diet forvpopulation  of  this size  without 
causing  food  imports  to  rise drastically,  the  required  growth  rate for  food 
production  is  above  5  percent.  Such  high  growth  r~tes  can  only  be  achieved  in 
extremely  fav6urable  circumstances. 
A slower  population  growth  in  Kenya  would  greatly facilitate  the  attainment  of··. 
food  security  i.n  the  future.  The  same  can  be  said for  Rwanda  and,  given  available 
resources  as  well  for  Mali.  Rural  to  urban  ~igration will  further  aggravate 
the  problem.  Given  current  migration  trends  labour  productivity  in  food  products 
must  increase still more  rapidly  than  average  food  production,  because  the· 
number  of  non-farmers  to  be  supported  by  a  farmer  will  increase.  The  migration 
trends  will  also  put  severe  pressure  on  the  marketing  ~ystem. 
A more  detailed discussion  of  population  issues  has  been  the  subject  of  another 
paper  by  the  Commission,  but  the  above  remarks  make  it clear  that  population 
issues  need  to  be  examined  in  the  context  of  food  strategies.  Policies  to be 
considered  in this  area  should  be  compatible  wi~h the  cultural  patterns of 
the  population  and  must  necessarily  be  ~ecided by  the  countries  themselves. 
On  the  basis  of  past  experience,  it  seems  that  indirect  policies  such  as 
·'those that  influence  the  attitudes  of  people  towards  the  desired  number 
and  spacing  bf  childreen  are  very  important. 
More  consideration  for  environmental  issues 
The  issues  of  food  availability and  environmental  degradation  are  closely 
interconnected.  These  interrelationships  are  less  visible  in  the  short 
run,  become  very  clear  in  the  medium  and  ·Long  run.  One  must  be  careful 
that  a  successful  medium  run  food  strategy does  not  deteriorate. the  future 
production potential  through  environmental  damage.  Thus,  it  is  advisable 
to  take  into  account  environmental  issues  in  food  strategies.  (Environmental 
issues  are  treated  in  another  document  of  the  Commission). 
Regional  coordination 
Up  to  now·,  the  food  strategy efforts  have  been  conceived  essentially at 
the  national  Level.  This  is  not  surprising  since  the  national  go.vernments 
are  responsible  for  formulating  and  implementing  ~evelopment policies suitable 
to  their  countries.  However,  the  problem  of  food  availability generally 
crosses  the  national  borders.  Three  of  the  four  food  strategy countries  are 
landlocked  and  therefore  they directly depend  on  neighbouring  countries  for 
critical  imports. 13. 
There  have  been  some  efforts  in Africa  towards  regionaL  coordination 
in  the  area  of  food  security,  the  '
1 Comit~  Inter~tat pour  la  Lutte  centre 
la  Secheresse  au  Sahel"  (CILSS)  being  an  important  t.>xample.  Tht.>  countries 
participating  in  CILSS  all  share  the  same  problems,  so  they  can  learn  from 
each  other's experience  in  coping  with  th~se problem&However,  due  to  the~r 
similarities they  have  only  a  limited potential  for  trade.  On  the other  hand 
there is more  potential  for  mutually  beneficial  integration between  the 
Sahel  countries and  the  countries on  the  West-African  coast,  as  there 
are  some  clear  comparative  advantages that  could  be  e~ploited. 
The  "Southern African  Development  Coordination  Conference"  (SADCC)  is 
another  important  regio~al grouping  in  Africa.  Several  cooperation 
efforts in the areas  of  food  and  agriculture are  underway  in  SADCC,  inclu-
ding  an  early  warning  system  for  regional  food  security  and  a  regional 
resources  inventory  and  information  system.  Community  Member  States  ~re 
directly  involved  in  these efforts. 
* 
*  * 
4.4  Data  availability  ---------
In  order  to allocate  resources  in  the  best  way  to  combat  hunger  one  needs 
a  diagnosis  of  the  food  situation for  different  population  classes.  This 
will  necessitate  an  effort  of  data  collection and  data  processing.  Both 
the  ~~T and  thel.D.S.reports  consider  the  weakness  of  currentty availa-
ble data  as  a  handicap  to  diagnose  the  current  food  situation and  to 
devise  adequate policies.  In  this  context  it may  be  impor~ant to observe 
that  the  cost  of  processing data  has  been  lowered  significantly  through 
the  rapid  progress  in  computer  hardware  and  software. 
Two  types  of  data  are particularly. Lacking  at  the  level  of  socio-economic 
d  f  m budgets.  Both  types  of  data  are  groups  :  consumption  patterns  an  ar 
very  important  to  judge  the  effects of  food  policy measures. 14. 
5.  THE  COMMUNITY'S  SUPPORT  TO  FOOD  STRATEGIES 
Towards  the  end  of  1981,  the  Council  approved  the  Commission's  Plan 
to  Combat  Wo;~d Hunger.  One  of  the  central  elements  of  that  plan 
consisted  in  support  for  national  food  strategies.  Following the 
Council's  decision  the  Commission  has  examined' the  possibilities 
to  fruitfully  support  food  strategies  in  a  number  of  countries. 
Three  criteria were  used  to  identify the .countries  with  which  a· 
start  could  be  made: 
- they  had  to  be  countries  with  a  sizeable  food  deficit 
- they  had  to  have  the  capacity  and  willingness  to  impl~ment  change~ 
in  their  food  policies 
- they  had  to  be  receiving  substantial  aid  from  the  European  Community 
and  its Member  States. 
On  the  basis  of  these  criteria, the  Council  has  agreed  ,  in  the 
course  of  1982,  to assist  four  countries:  Mali,  Kenya,  Zambia  and 
Rwanda. 
Several  other  countri~s  includinq  Benin,  Burundi,  Ethiopia,  Ivory 
Coast,  Niger,  Madagascar,  Senegal,  Somalia,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zaire, 
Tunisia  and  Morocco  also  expressed  their  wish  for  EC  suooort  i~ 
the  area  of  food  strategies.  Even  thouqh  it would  have  been  desirable 
to  extend  support  for  food  strateaies to  more  countries  meetinq  the 
above  criteria,  limitinq  the  exercise  initially to  a  small  number 
of  countries  was  considered  the  best  way  to  test  thP.  viahility of  a 
new  approach. 
However,  preliminary discussions  were  held  with  some  other  countries. 
Moreover  the  Commission  hai  recently  accorded  technical  assistance 
for  the  preparation  and  coordination of  measures  to  be  taken  in 
support  of  Tanzania's  food  strategy.  (See  Annex  on  Tanzania). 
Also  a  background  study  on  the  Uqandan  food  sector  was 
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recently  completed.  This  study  was  prepared  at  the  request  of  the  Ugandan 
Government  with  support  from  the  Commission. 
With  respect to  the  ACr  c0untries  ~en.tioned above,  the  third  Lome 
convention  will  prnvirle  the  natural  framework  within  which  to  engage 
future  food  strategy activities. 
In  addition,  it  seems  important  to  envisage possibilities to  extend  food 
strategy  support  to  non-ACP  countries  as  well, insofar  as  these  countries 
would  satisfy the  criteria mentioned  above. 
Some  basic  principles  have  guided  the  Community's  approach  to  the  support 
of  food  strategies: 
formulation  and  implementation  of  a  food  strategy  is  erimarily the 
reseonsibility  of  the  country  concerned 
- Community  support  should be  complementary  to  national  efforts 
- optimal  coordination  is  sought  with ~~mber States  and  other  donors  whose 
actions  may  contribute  to  the  food  strategy objectives 
- an  effort  is  made  to  reach  agreement  on  a  number  of  mutual  co'mmitments 
in  view  of  attaining  the  food  strategy objectives;  these  mutual  com-
mitments  are  generally  pluriannual  in order  to  ensure  continuity. 
With  respect  to  organization,  one  must  consider  the  fact  that  a'food 
strategy  is a  complex  undertaking.  The  problems  addressed  in  a  food 
strategy  normally  fall  urider  the ·competence  of several  National  Ministries: 
agriculture,  economic  affairs,  finance,  transport,  public  work~ and 
sometimes  health  and  education.  Also,  in  virtually all  cases,  one  or  more 
autonomous  public  bodies  such  as  marketing  9oards  and  rural  financial 
institutions  are  directly  involved.  Furthermore,  other  donors  besides  th~ 
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EEC  and  its Member  States  are  involved  in  actions  that  relate  to the 
food  situation.  In  order  to  ensure optimal  coordination  between ·these 
numerous  "actors",  the  Commission  has  favoured  the  setting  up  of special 
·"working  groups"  or  "consultative committees"in  the  ACr  countrie'~  concerned. 
These  working  groups  consist  of  representatives  of. the  main  Ministries, 
public  bodies  and  donors  that  are  involved  in  food  strategy  issues.  Theyare 
conceived  to  be  of  an  informal  and  advisory  nature  and  are  intended to  be 
the  forum  for  policy  dialogue.  In  all  cases,  the  approach  to  organization 
has  been  flexible  and  pragmatic. 
Coordination  and  exchange  of  information  between 'the  Commission  a~d 
Member  States  on  food  st~ategies  has  been  arranged b0th  in Brussels  and  in 
the  beneficiary  countries  through  a  number  of  ad  hoc  expert  meetings. 
With  respect  to  instruments,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  at  the  time 
when  the  Community  embarked  on  food  strategies,  no  instruments  were  specifi-
cally  earmarked  to  support  the  exercise.  However,  over  the  past ·couple  of 
years  the  Commission  was  able  to  use  iifferent  existing  instruments  in  a 
coherent  way  in  the  support  of  food  strategies  •. ·  This  is  illustrated  in 
table 1.  More  country  specific  detail~ are  included  in  the  Annexes. 
With  respect  to  existing  financial  instruments  one  has  in  the  first  place 
examined  the  possibilities  for  revising  the  indicative  programme  of  the 
current EDF  in  view  of  food  strategy objectives.  This  resulted  in  changes 
for  Mali,  Kenya  and  Rwanda.  In  addition,  the  margin  between  the  upper  anc 
Lower  bounds  of  the  indicative programme  (bracket)  has  also been  used  to 
increase  support  in  Line  with  the  food  strategy. 
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In  the  case  of  Kenya,  a  STABEX  transfer  was  used  as  an  instrument  to  support  the 
food  strategy effort.  The  STABEX  transfer  for  1983  was  allocated  to  the  cereals. 
marketing  board  to  become  part  of  a  revolving  fund  that  would  allow  to  speed  up 
payments  for  delivered  farm  produce. 
The  food  strategy  countries  have  also  benefited  from  a  special  aid  programme 
(art.  958).  The  actions  envisaged  in  this  context  are  all directly  related  to 
the  food  strategy effort  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  Rwanda  they  include  a  contribution 
to  a  strategic  food  reserve  stock,  assistance  with  the  construction  of  district 
warehouses  for  the  major  marketing  board,  the  introduction  of  fertilizers 
together  with  appropriate  advisory  services,  ~n agricultural  resources  inventory 
and  support  to  nutritional  centres). 
The  country  annexes  contain  an  overview  of  the  areas  in  which  the  funds  of  this 
special  programme  are  used.  Apart  from  the  food  strategy  ~ountries, .several 
other  countries  have  also  benefited  from  this  programme. 
Even  though  such  actions  represent  only  a  small  fraction  of  total  Community 
plus  Member  Countries'  assistance  to  these  countries  they  are  very  important 
in  encouraging  the  full  food  strategy effort,  because  they  offer  a  possibility 
to  concretise  the  general  prin~iples. 
Food  aid  has  also  become  an  important  instrument  that  has  been  put  to  work  in 
food  strategies,to an  important  extent  through  the  use  of  counterpart  funds. 
This  is  fully  in  Line  with  some  of  the  original  considerations  that  Led  to  the 
food  strategy approach.  As  mentioned  already  above,  in  the  case  of  Mali  food 
aid  has  been  used  to  support  the  cereals  market  restructuring  proj~ct.  The  food 
was  provided  to  the  cereals  marketing  board  to  improve  its financial  position  and 
allow  it  to  increase prices  paid  to  farmers  without  at  the  same  time  increasing 
consumer  prices.  Similarly  in  Kenya  and  Rwanda  food  aid  was  chanelled  to  the 
main  marketing  board  to  strenghten  its position.  With  respect  to  triangular 
food  aid operations  Kenya  has  benefited,  as  ~ supplier,  whereas  both  Mali  and 
Zambia  have  benefited  as  receivers. 
The  Council's  resolution  on  food  aid  of  November  1983  has  already  endorsed  a 
number  of  principles  that  allow  to  integrate  food  aid  into  a  food  strategy. 
The  most  important  of  these  principles' are  : 
Food  aid  should  not  be  provided  as  such,  but  it  should  be  fitted  into  the  agri-
cultural  development  effort  and  should  be  consistent  with  the  general  food  policy 
pursued  by  the  beneficiary  country.  Food'aid  should  not  disrupt  the  national 
market.  Counterpart  funds  should  be  used  to  promote  rural  development  actioni. 
Free  food  distribution  should  specifically be  geared  to  vulnerable  groups  or 
should  take  place  in  exchange  for  work. 
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Table  1  Community  instruments  used  in  the  support  of  food  strategies 
MALI  KENYA  ZAMBIA  RWANDA 
Restructuring  indicative  aid  programme  '*  *  * 
(including  use  of  existing  bracket) 
Use  of  STABEX  transfers  * 
Special  Programme  (art.  958)  *  *  *  * 
Food  aid 
. direct  *  *  *  *  . counterpart  funds  *  *  * 
triangular  *'  *  * 19. 
6.  POSSIBLE  ROLE  OF  THE  CO~MUNITY 
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From  the  description  of  the  Community's  experience  in  supporting  food  strategies 
in  four  countries,  it  is  clear  that  several  development  cooperation  instruments 
can  be  fruitfully  incorporated  into  these  strategies.  Until  now,  the  approach 
has  been  more  or  less  ad  hoc,  but  it  would  be  desirable  to  make  it more  syste-
matic  as  well  as  to  generalize  it to  other  countries. 
·The  proposals  of  the  new  Lorn~  convention  indicate  that  agricultural  cooperation 
will  "support  strategies  and  policies"  in  this  field.  This  will  make  it  possible 
to  use  the  resources  of  the  indicative  programme,  in  ACP  countries  that  agree 
to  it,  in  a  way  that  contributes  to  food  strategy objectives,  thereby  genera-
Lizing  the  experience  that  was  gained  in  Mali,  Rwanda,  Zambia  and  Kenya.  In  a 
similar  way,  the  Council's  Resolution  on  food  aid  of  November  1983  enables  to 
generalize  to other  countries  the  approach  applied  in  Mali,  Rwanda,  Zambia  and 
·Kenya  with  respect  to  the  integration  of  food  aid  into  food  strategies. 
It  remains  to  be  examined  whether  and  how  food  strategy assistince  can  be 
accorded  to  non-ACP  countries. 
The  experience  with  regard  to  food  ~trategies  in  the  four  countries  as  described 
in  the  annexes  shows  important  progress;  however  there  are  a  number  of  elements 
that  up  to  now  did  not  receive  sufficient 'attention.  The  Community,  in  colla-
boration  with  Member  States,  may,  in  particular  through  the  coordination  appa-
ratus  that  it helped  to  set  up,  contribute  to· increase  the  eff~ctiveness of 
food·strategies. 
In  this  respect  it  seems  important  to  : 
•  give  more  attention  to  consumption  and  the  nutritional  needs  of  vulnerable 
groups 
emphasize  more  :  crops  such  as  sorghum,  millet,  cassava  and  pulses  as  well  as 
livestock,  fisheries  and  rural  non-agricultural  income  generating activities 
.  improve  the  position  of  women  in  their  role  of  food  producers 
.  encourage  the  government  to  adopt  a  well-balanced  food  policy package. 
It  must  be  observed  that  the  above  mentioned  issues  cannot  be  addressed  simul-
taneously,  priorities mut  be  established according  to  specific  country  needs • 
. I. 20. 
Involvement  of  farmers  organisations  may  be  helpful  to  obtain better balanced 
food  strategies.  The  experience  of  European  farmers  organisations  can  be  very 
useful.  The  Community  could  promote  cooperation  between  European  farmers 
organisations  and  their  counterparts  in  food  strategy  count~ies.  A proposal 
)o support  the  Rwandan  food  strategy  has  been  received  recently  from  the 
International  Federation  of  Agricultural  Producers. 
NGO's  could  also  be  involved  more  in  food  strategies. (cfr.  the  action  alreay 
undertaken  by  Medecins  Sans  Frontieres  in  Mali). 
One  of  the  basic  principles  of  the  food  strategy approach  is  to  integrate 
various  types  of  actions  in  a  unified  framework.  Because  of  the  complexity 
of  food  issues,  the  approach  has  generally  been  to  subdivide  the  effort  in  a 
number  of  stages.  Some  improvements  could  be  made  in  this .respect  through  : 
•  more  detailed diagnosis  especially at  the  Level  of  particular  population 
classes  and  regions 
•  more  refined  analysis  of  the  mechanisms  that  explain  why  particular 
population  groups  remain  or  become  malnourished 
•  further  evaluation  of  the  effects  of  alternative  government  policies  on  the 
basis  of  which  an  action  programme  is  chosen 
•  a  more  careful  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  the  policies  and  actions  that 
are  currently  implemented. 
Improvements  in all  the  above  mentioned  areas  wilt  critically depend  on 
the  availability of  adequate  data  and  skilled  manpower.  The  Statistical 
Office  of  the  European  Communities  is  already  engaged  in  efforts  to  improve 
the  statistical  system  in  several  African  countries.  It  is  very  important  to 
ensure  that  these efforts  take  into  account  the  needs  of  food  strategies. 
0 
Farmers  organizati~s  can  also  have  a  role  with  respect  to  data· especially on 
farm  management. 
Diagnosis,  analysis  of  alternative  policies  and  monitoring  and  evaluation 
in  relation  to  food  strategies  should  preferably  be  carried out.by the 
countries  themselves.  However,  skilled manpower  in  this  respect 'is  tack1ng. 
Lack  of  human  resources  also  makes  it difficult  for  many  countries  to 
engage  in  policy dialogue.  Their  capacity  to  an~Lyse independently  food  policy 
issues  and  to  enter  into  policy dialogue  should  be  strenghtened.  The  Community· 
seems  well  placed  to  support  efforts  in. this direction, particularly through 
institutions building activities,  technical  assistance  and  training. 
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One  practical  possibility  could  be  to  organize  at  regular  intervals training 
seminars  for  the  persons  working  in  food  strategy units. 
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In  the  medium  and  Long  run,  the  issues  of  population,  environmental  quality 
and  food  availability are  closely  Linked.  It  seems  important  that  food 
strategies take  these  linkages  into  consideration. 
As  already  explained  above,  several  issues  related  to  food  availability 
cannot  adequately  be  solved  at  country  Level.  'In  some  cases  the  Community 
and  its Member  States  are  already making  contributions  in  this  respect, 
particularly in  the  areas  of  agricultural  researchJdesertification control, 
remote  sensing  and  the  struggle  against  animal  diseases  such  as  rinderpest. 
The  Community  seems  well  suited  to  support  such  efforts  towards  regional 
coordination of  food  strategies. MALI  STRATEGIE  ALIMENTAIRE 
1.  N6e  d'une  r6flexion  sur  L'int6gration  de  l'aide alimentaire  dan~ une 
politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire,  La  strategie alimentaire s'est 
d'abord  developpee,  dans  le  cadre  du  programme  de  restructuration du  marche 
cerealier  (PRMC),  dans  les  domaines  des  prix a La  production et de  La 
commercialisation  des  cereales.  Il s'agissait  de  relever  les prix  a la 
production  pour  les  rendre  incitatifs et  done  stimuler  la  production. 
Parallelement  le  PRMC  etait oriente vers  La  reduction  des  couts d'inter-
vention  de  l'Office  cerealier  (OPAM)  dans  le  meme  temps ·au  se  trouvait 
liberalisee  la  commercialisation  des  cereales  a l'exception  du  riz. 
2.  La  mise  en  oeuvre  du  PRMC  depuis  mars·1981,  epoque  ou  il a  fait  l'objet 
d'engagements  reciproques  de  La  part  du  gouvernement  de.la  Republique 
du  Mali  et  du  groupe  des  donateurs,  s'est traduite effectivement  pendant 
les  trois premieres  campagnes  par  un  relevement  sensible  du  prix a la 
production  (+  60  % pour  le  paddy,  +  44  %pour  les  cultures  seches),  par 
une  reduction  de  La  distorsion entre  les  prix officiels  de  vente a la 
consommation  et  les  prix  reellement  pratiques,  ainsi  que  par  une  baisse 
remarquable  du  deficit d'exploitation de  l'OPAM  passe de  4,5  a 2 milliards 
FM  (1) 
3.  Par  ses objectifs  comme  par  ses ·modalites  d'execution,  le  PRMC  s'inscrit 
dans  la  logique  d'une  politique  economique  orient6e,  en  accord  avec  le 
FMI,  vers  une  meilleure utilisation des  forces  du  marche.  Il en  est 
egalement  tributaire  :  l'objectif de  relevement  progressif  des  prix a la 
production est  difficile a poursuivre  dans  une  conjoncture  marquee  par  le 
bloquage  des  traitements  de  la  fonction  publique.  Pour  tenir  compte 
de  cette contrainte,  il a  ete decide  pour  l'actuelle campagne  de  faire 
une  pause  dans  le  processus  d'augmentation  des  prix  a La  production  san~ 
que  cela  remette  en  ca~se  le  principe de  leur  re~evement progressif. 
Il  est  entendu  que  La  reprise  du  mouvement  initie en  1981/82  interviendra 
des  que  l'evolution de  La  situation  le  r~ndra possible. 
.!. 
(1)  1  FCFA  2  FM 2. 
4.  Au  cours  de  reunions  tenues  fin  1983  aussi  bien a Bamako  entre  les 
donateurs  engages  dans  le  PRMC  qu'a Bruxelles entre experts  desJ Etats 
'  . 
membres  et  Commission,  on  s'est  interroge sur  les  meilleurs  moyens 
d'atteindre  les. objectifs  fondamentaux  de  La  politique  c'reali~re du 
Mali.  IL  fut  alors  question d'extension du  PRMC,  seton  La  meme  Logique · 
d'engagements  reciporoques  et d'utilisation des  fonds  de  contrepartie 
a l'appui  des  politiques structurelles  conduites  par  les  autorites 
maliennes.  L'accord s'est alors  fait  sur  L'opportunite d'etendre  Le 
PRMC  a des  programmes  d'appui  a La  restructuration  des  Operations de 
Developpement  Rural  (ODR>  tendant  a reduire  les  coOts  de  la  filiere 
agro-alimentaire  et  a'favoriser  La  croissance de  La  production 
.cereatiere. 
5.  Dans  cette perspective,  il est vite apparu prioritaire en  ce  debut 
d'annee  1984,  au  moment  o~  Le  Mali  s'appretait  a  rentrer dans  L'Union' 
Monetaire  Ouest  Africaine et  ou,  de  ce  fait,  il etait  confronte a la 
necessite de  revoir  Les  bases  sur  tesquelles  etait attribue  te  credit 
aux  trois  OOR  rizir.oles  - Office  du  Niger,  Operation  Riz  Segou  et  Operation 
Riz  Mopti-,  de  soutenir  La  politique malienne  de  LiberaLisation de  la 
commercialisation  du  paddy.  Compte  tenu  de  L'importance  et  de  La 
complexite  de  ces  ODR  d'une  part,  de  La  place  tenue  par  ces  trois  OOR  dans 
l'appro~isionnement des  marches  urbains  en  riz d'autre part,  il n'etait 
pas  possible  en  effet  pour  le  gouvernement  maLien  de  s'engager dans  cette 
voie  sans  l'aide de  la  communaute  internationale.  Fort'.de  son  soutien 
il a  pu  prendre  La  decision  de  liberaliser progressivement  le  commerce 
du  riz.  Les  modalites  de  l'engagement  recipr.oque  doivent etre arretees 
prochainement. 
.1 •. 6.  Avec  Leur  engagement  i  soutenir  La  Liberalisation du  commerce  du  r1z,  les' 
donateurs,  au  premier  rang  desqueLs  se  trouve  Le  groupe  des  Etats  Membres  et· 
de  La  Commission,  se  trouvent  une  nouvelle  fois  confrontes  il'  L·'exigence  d'agir 
d'un  commun  accord  en  faveur  d'un  programme  aux  aspects  multiples.  Il .Leur 
faudra  faire  La  preuve  qu'ils  sont  capables  de  s'entendre  non  seulement  sur. 
Les  objectifs  ~  atteindre,  mais  encore  sur .les  moyens  a mobiliser  sur
1une 
periode  pluri-annuelle  pour  mener  ~  bien·  La  politique  conduite  par  Les  autorites 
maliennes.  Cela  implique  un  effort  de  concert~tion et  La  recherche d'un  c~ns~Msus 
sur  L'utiLisation des  fonds  de  contre-partie de  L~aide alimentaire. 
7.  ParaLlelement a ses  engagements  aux  cotes  des  autres  donateurs  dans  le  cadre  du 
PRMC  et  de  son  programme  d'extension,  La  Communaute  attache  une  particuliere 
attention  a· trois operations  : 
- La  restructuration de  L'Office du  Niger; 
- La  creation d'empLois  productifs  hors  du  secteur d'Etat; 
- l'action de  Lutte  contre  La  malnutrition. 
8.  L'Office  du  Niger  tient  une  place centrale dans  La  production  du  riz au  Mali.· 
Ses  structures de  gestion et  d'exploitation  ne  rep~ndent plus  aux  exigences  de 
La  politique  rizicole du  Mali.  Les  bailleurs de  fo~ds sollicitis pour  finah~er 
La  restructuration  de  L'Office  ont  souhaite  faire  le point  sur  La  situation 
financiire.  Les  mesures  a prendre  dans  le  cadre  de  La  restruiturdtion  int~res­
sent  aussi  bien  La  gestion que  Les  infra~tru~tures hydro-agricoles  et  Le  trans-
fert  de  certaines fonctions  aux  paysans  dont  Le  statut est a revoir.  Pour 
contribuer a cette poLitique,  La  Commission  peut  mobiliser  certains  des  credits 
aff.ectes  au  Mali  au  titre du  programme  special  1983  de  La  Lutte  contre  La  faim 
dans  Le  Monde- 1,3  mio  ECU  sont  p~evus pour  La  fourniture d'intrants et 
d'equipement  pour  les  ODR  en  cours  de  restructuration - et au  credit  de  7,3 mio 
ECU  prevu  dans  le  cadre  du  programme  indicatif  ~our financer  un  projet  en  faveur 
de  l'Office.  Elle  le  fera  de  fa~on graduelle  en  liaison avec  les  reformes  de 
structure qui  seront  mises  en·oeuvre. 
9.  La  restructuration du  secteur d'Etat  po•e  en  termes  aigus  Le  probleme  des  effec-
tifs du  Eecteur  public  et  de  l'emploi  des  jeunes.  Si  Les  autorites  m~Liennes. ne 
parviennent  pas  ~  susciter par  ~ne politique adaptee  La  creation  d'~mplois 
productifs  hors  du  secteur d'Etat,  cette politique  se  trouvera  vite confrontee 
~  des  tensions  sociaLes  qui  remettront  en  c.~use ses orientations.  La  Commission 
a  finance  une  expertise  pour  examiner  les  moyens  d'encourager  La  creation 
d'entreprises;  elle a  reserve  un  credit d'environ 1,5  mio  ECU  dans  le  programme· 
indicatif  pour  La  suite a donner  ~  cette operation. 
10.  La  Lutte  contre  La  malnutrition  au  Mali  tend a prendre  un  caractere  permanent 
avec  Lapersistance  de  La  secheresse  dans  La  zone  sahelienne.  Elle  est  rendue 
extremement  difficile par  La  dispersion des  populations a secourir,  le  mauvais 
etat  des  pistes  rurales  et  La  mauvaise  organisation de  L'approvisionnement  en 
.cereales  des  Localites. 
Une  carte nutritionnelle du  Mali  va  etre dressee  et.des  actions  medico-nutri-
tionnelles  du  type  de  celles  menees  par  Medecins  sa~s 'frontieres  (aide d'urgence 
accordee  debut  84>  devront  etre entreprises·pour  re~edier a une  situation 
~ritique que  La  strategie alimentaire  se  propose  de  comb~ttre. 11.  IL  est  a  noter que,  dans  son  action  de  soutien a  La  strategie aLimentaire  du 
Mali,  La  Commission  peut  mobiliser,  a  cote  des  fonds  de  contrepartie'de  l'aide 
alimentaire et des  credits du  programme  indicatif dont  60%  sont  affectes  au 
developpement  agro-pastoral,  les  aides d'urgence  pour  faire  face  aux  conse-
quences  de  La  secheresse  et  les  credits de  l'art. 958  dont  en  1983  en>  5  mio. 
ECU  ont  ete attribues au  Mali  so it 4  mio  ECU  pour  les  act ions  de  sou'tien a La 
strategie aLimentaire  et  1  mio  ECU  pour  Les  actions  thematiques. 
12.  La  strategie alimentaire devient  au  Mali  un  pole  de  l'action publique  autour 
duquel  s'ordonnent  de  nombreux  projets et  programmes  inities par  Le  gouverne-
ment  malien  et  soutenus  par  l'aide  internationale.  Dans  La  logique de  La  poli-
tique  economique  suivie par  Les  autorites maliennes,  cette strategie est 
amenee  a  s'interesser, au-dela  des  domaines  de  commercialisation des  cereales 
qui  ont  constitue son  champ  d'appLication original, aux  questions  de  production 
et a La  restructuration des  ORO  qui  servent d'instrument a La  politique de 
developpement  rural.  ELLe  rend  imperative  un  engagement  toujours  plus  ferme 
et  concerte  des  donateurs  au  service de  ses objectifs. 
(1)  en  1984,  Les  credits  envisages  se  montent  a  3,3 mio  ECU. KENYA  FOOD  STRATEGY 
1.  The  events  and  considerations  Leading  to  the  National  Food  Plan 
and  subsequent  events. 
1.1.  Like  many  other  countries  in Africa,  Kenya  is subject  to cyclical 
droughts.  The  1979/80  drought  underlined  the  importance  of 
strategic  food  security planning  and  the  government  responded  with 
a  National  Food  Pol,icy  paper  which  stated  the government\ 
determination  to establish  food  self  reliance,  food  security within 
the  overall  plan  to  expand  agricultural output  and  exports.  The 
present  drought  situation  in  the  country,  reminiscent  of 1979/80, 
finds  the  governm~nt unorP.oa,.ed(despitP.  some  food  secudty p'rogress> 
to  confront  food  shortages  and  in  some  cases  serious malnutrition 
and  famine. 
1.2.  Immediate  underlying  causes  for  the  periodic  but  persistent  food 
deficits are  the  failures of  rainfall,  insufficiency of  incentives 
for  marketable  production,  inefficient and  unresponsive  monopolistic 
marketing  and  other  institutions and  a  somewhat-erratic  and  ins•eur~ 
supply of  critically needed  agricultural  inputs,  equipment  and  fuel. 
In  the  longer  term  the  most  worrisome  aspect  is the  relatively  Low 
level  trend  of  food  and  agricultural production growth  (4.5  %)  against 
one  of  the  highest  population 9rowth  rates  in Africa  - around  4  r. 
per  annum.  This persistent  inability to assure  food  supplies 
at  affordable  prices  in  a  relatively pragmatic  and  democrat~c 
environment  has  direct  implications  for  socio  economic  and  political 
stability.  T~~s the  implemen~ation of  a  food  strategy deserves 
attention. 
2.  The  approach  adopted  to  im~lement the  'National  Food  Policy'. 
2.1.  The  objectives of  the  NFP  are  to, 
- maintain  self sufficiency  in  main  foodstuffs  and  minimise  i~ports, 
- achieve  a  calculated degree  of  food  supply across  th~ country, 
- ensure  a  nutritionally adequate  diet. 
Attention  is  focussed  on  both'.food  and  export  products  and  production 
and  marketing  systems  and  incentives are  to be  restructured  so  that 
they  are  consistent  with  a  lower  than  previously planned  rate of 
economic  growth  (3.3  X>  and  a  high  p6pulation  growth  (4  X). 
2.2.  The  above  mentioned  ~aper was  not  followed  by  a  plan  of  action nor·by 
legislative programme.  But  its quidelines  have  been  followed  by  the 
IMF  standby  arrangements  and  World  Bank  structural adjustment  credits 
the  second  of  which  specifically addresses  agricultural  constraints. 
The  Kenya/European  Communities  Food  Strategy dialogue  ~ot  under  way 
in  1982. 2.3.  Since  1980  producer  incentives  have  been  con~istently improved, 
especially those  relative to  cereals,  attempts  are  underway  to 
avoid  consumer  subsidies.  Ta~fffs have  been  restructured and  some 
reduced.  Management  of agricultural  programmes  and  projects  is 
being  improved. 
2.4. The  momentum  of  these  reforms  has  been  slowed  down  howev~r by  two 
interrelated factors.  The  first  is the  fear  that  radical 
liberalisation of  the grain  market,which  would  reduce  th~  role 
of  government  in  grain marketing,  might  have  destabilising  imcli-
cations.  The  second  factor  is the  crisis management  underway  to 
face  the  1984  drought  and  the  associated food  deficits and 
at  affordable prices. 
3.  The  orientations  and  priorities of  the  EC/Kenya  food  strategy 
dialogue. 
3.1.  Pricing  and  marketing  policy  reforms  are given ~Verriding priority 
because  inadequacies  and  inefficiencies of  state  intervention  in 
the grain market  have  immediate  and  serious effects on  food  and 
agricultural  output  and  consumption  as  well  as  on  the  balance  of 
payments  and  the  budget. 
3.2.  Recommendations  of  a  World  Bank  supported  study  and  those  of  an 
interministerial  study group  have  been  before  the  cabinet  but 
there  is no  deci~ion as  yet  on  their  implementation.  Among  other 
things  this  has  hamoerP.d  progress  with  a  fo.tlow  up  study  t.o 
reorganise  the  admin1strative  and  financial  aspects of  a  restruc~red 
and  redefined  National  Cereals  and  Pnoduce  Bo.ard  (NCPB).  The 
Commission  has  agreed  in principle  to the  Kenyan  government's 
request  that  they  support  this  study. 
3.3.  Because  of  the  inevitable  slow  progress  in grain  marketing  r~forms 
the dialogue  is being  widened  and  diversified and  attention is being 
directed to other priority ar·eas. 
These areas  are:  farm  storage  and  reduction of  post  harvest  losses, 
farm  systems  research  including  formulation  of  smallholder packages, 
rural  access  roads  and  nutrition  improvement  programmes.  Attention 
to  issues  of  provision and  marketing  of  agricultural  inputs,  and 
credit  must  for  the  time  being  await  the outcome  of  events  in  the 
grain marketing  sector as  well  as  that of  studies  which  a~e already 
under  way  (supported  by  other donors).  · 
4.  Commission  support  to the  Food  Strategy  has  thus  far  been  comprised  of  . 
the  following  : 
- Triangular  Food  Cooperation.  The  EEC  purchased  1800  T of  beans  from. 
Kenya  under  the  1983  programme,  which  they  then  gave  as  food  aid  to 
Sao  Tome  and  Zimbabwe.  In  the  same  year  the  WFP  purchased  20,000  T of 
white  maize  from  Kenya  using· EEC  funds,  and  gave  this as  food  aid  to  · 
Mozambique.  The  1984  drought  made  it  impossible  for  Keny.a  to· 
participate  in  triangular operations .this past  year  ;  however, 
pdssibilities for  this  type  of  transaction will  continue  to  be  explored. 
- A contribution  of  4.6  M ECU  (Linked  to the  1981  Stabex  transfer)  was 
given  at  the  government's  own  insistance  to a  revolving  crop  procu-
rement  fund  of  the  NCPB. 
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-The 1983  Special  Programme  allocation of /t1MECU  supplemented  the 
NCPB  crop  procurement  fund  already established. 
The  1984  Special  Programme  allocation of  approximately 3  M.ECU  is 
expected  to  be  used  for  a  rural  access  road  project. 
Special  and  regular  provision of  food  aid  allocations and  disasier 
relief  from  1975  to 1983  were  as  follows:  20.2  M.ECU  were  earmarked 
for  direct  food  aid  to  Kenya,  while  7.6  M.ECU  were  allocated  for 
indirect aids.  Exceptional  aids  for  emergency  relief totalled 
2.4  M.ECU. 
-Counterpart  fund  utili~ation- see  annex. 
- Training  of  food  sector statisticians in the  Central  Bureau  of 
Statistics,  Kenya-was  ~ontinued from  the  Lome  II  indicative  programme. 
- The  Commission  granted  an  ~dditional 14  M.ECU  on  top of  the  minimum 
74  M.ECU  related to  Lome  II  indicative amouht  bracket  because  of  · 
the  strategy dialogue.  The  government  has  agreed  to earmark  most  of 
these  funds  for  projects  related  to  the  food  strategy. 
~·  Coordination  related  to definition and  implementation  of  the  food 
strategy. 
5.1.  The  system  of  committees  (a  Kenya/EEC  Consultative  Committee,  sectoral 
donor  working  groups  and  the  technical  committee  of  the  EC  delegate 
and  EC  Member  Country  representativ~ set  up  at  the  launching  of  the 
dialogue  is  under  review.  This  responds  partly to  new  developments 
in  aid coordination arising  from  recommendations  of  the  World  .sank 
Consultative  Group  in  Kenya. 
The  creation of  the  Kenya/EEC  Consultative  Committee  is also in part 
a  response  to  the  growing  unease  on  the part  of  the  Kenyan  government 
which  is worried  that  donors  may  ..,e  tempted  to f.orge.  a  common  front 
and  impose  hard  conditionality of  policies  linked to all external 
assistance. 
There  are  some  grounds  for  this  latter fear.  given  the  way  that  the  United 
States  has  conducted  itself in  attempting  to  link macroeconomic 
policies  to all aid  requests  under  consideration  fncluding  the 
al)p ..  L for  diluter r1 Lief.  In  eny  cue thtrt 11  1  conaiderab~t · 
consensus  that  the  responsibility for  donor  coordination must  rest 
with  the  Kenyans  themselves. 
There  is~nevertheless, a  close  coordination on  all  issues  related 
to  the  food  strategy between  Member  States" representatives,. both  in 
Nairobi  and  in  the  European  capitals.  To  this end  an  important 
meeting  took  place  in  March  1984  in Brussels between  Member  States 
and  Commission  experts. 
5.2.  Coordination within the  Kenyan  government  between  the office of  the 
President  and  other mini.stries  continues to be  fragile,  and  had  a 
tendancy  to  focus  on  issues of  emergency  assistance and  needs  for 
quick  cash  rather  than  on  discussion of  policy strategy and 
programmes. Financing  of  food  strategy projects through  ~he use.of  a  special 
food  aid  counterpart  fund. 
Implemented  actions 
Turkana  Rehabili~ation Programme 
(developing  agricultural  livestock  and 
water  resources) 
Actions  under  implementation 
1982/83 
Turkana  Rehabilitation  Programme  1983/84 
Veterinary Centres  and  Cattle  Dips, 
Coast  Province  <aim  to  control  tickborne 
and  other  livestock  diseases  1983/84 
MIDP  Phase  I  Extension  1983/84 
CMachakos  Integrated Development 
Proa~emm• •imt  '~ ''•uiLi•• egrivwL,wr•L 
production,  develop  water  resources  and 
integrate a  soil  conservation programme 
in arid area).  · 
Total 
Balance  unspent 
(*)  June  1984  : '1"ECU  •  11,6170 K Sh. 
5,9 million<•> 
10,0 mill  ion 
5,0 mHlioo· 
25,5 mill  ion 
46,4 million 
19,3 mill  ion - ~-
STRATEGIE  ALIMENTAIRE  AU  RWANDA 
Etat  d'avancement  n°  3 
Ce  document  constitue  une  mise  a jour  de  la  situation telle que  pr~sentee 
dans  les  documents  Conseil  7380/84  du  24  mai  1984  et  SEC(83)1i11  du.  · · 
27  octobre  1983,  auquel  il  y  a  lieu de  se'referer notamment  en  ce  qui 
concerne  l'historique de  la  mise  en  place de  la  strategie alimentaire  au 
Rwanda. 
I. L'engagement  du  Rwanda  en  faveur  de  la strategie alimentaire 
Le  President,  dans  son  dernier  di scours  a  reaffirme  son  attacheme.nt  a 
La  cause  de  La  strategie alimentaire qu'·il  a fait  sienne.  En  insistant 
sur  ce  theme  majeur  de  sa  politique de  developpement,  il a  notamment 
signale  que  La  strategie alimentaire s'etend au·  clela  ciu  seul  domaine 
agricole "stricto senso"  <"notre  politique·d'accroissement  du  pouvoir 
d'achat  en  milieu  rural  vise  L'industrialisation rurale"  qui  sera 
"deconcentree,  de  petites et  moyenn~s dimensions"). 
II. La  mobilisation de  L'aide  communautaire  au  soutien de  La  strat~gie 
al imentaire 
A.  Programme  special  de  lutte  contre  La  fa~m dans  le  monde  Cart.  958) 
Pour  rappel,  dans  le  cadre  de  La  coordination  qui  se  fait  a Kigali 
entre  le  Rwanda,  les  Etats  'embres  representes  sur  place et  La  · 
Commission,  notamment  au  s1.;·in  du  "groupe  de  travail  euro-rwandais", 
un  programme  d'actions  pri~r~taires p~ur  La  mise  en  oeuvre  de  La 
strategie alimentaire,  a.ete  identifie en  1983. 
I l  s'  ag it  :. 
- erlmatiere  de  soutien  et  d'organisation  de  La  commercialisation  des 
prorluits  vivriers  : 
1.  Extension  du  reseau  des  comptoirs  de  vente  et  d'achat  de  l'OPROVIA 
2.  Contribution a  La  constitution  du  stock  de  securite  alimentaire 
3.  Schema  directeur  d~s agro-industries. 
-en  ~atiere de  preparation a  t'i~tensification  a~ricole et  ce 
conservation  des  sols 
4.  Introduction des  intrants-fertilisants mineraux  ~t  vulgarisation 
associee 
5.  Appui  methodologique  a  La  vulgarisation 
6.  Inventaire  du  capital  sol 
- en  matiere  de  diversification et  surveillance nutritionnelle 
7.  Appui  au  systeme  de  surveillance  centres nutritionnelle. 
Les  actions n°  1,  2 et  4  reprises  supra.ayant  ete  financees  par  La 
Commission  sur  le  budget  83,  La  Commission  entend  prendre  en  charge 
sur  le  budget  84  les actions  n°  6 et  7  ainsi  qu'un  complement  a· 
'-'action  n°  4. 
L'action  n°  3 etant  financ~e par  La  Banque  Mondiale  et  l'action n°  5 
ayant  ete orientee  sur  t'introduction des  ir.trants-fertilisants 
mineraux,  La  Commission  entend  prendre  egalement  en  charge  l'etude 
.1. - }It.  t.-. 
sur  la  commercialisation des  produits  vivriers.  L'importance  d.e  cette 
etude  s'est degagee  des  indications  du  colloque de  mai  1984 a Kigali 
organise  par  les  autorites  rwandaises  et  auquel  participaient  les 
representants  de  La  Delegation  de  La  Commission,  de  la Republique . 
federate  d'Allemagne,  de  la  Belgique,  de  ta  France  et  de  la Banaue 
Mondiale. 
L'etude  sur  la  commer·cialisation  permettra d'obtenir  des  recommahq~~ions 
quant  aux  interventions  structurelles qui  se  revtle~aient  necessai~~s 
p6ur  transformer  l'actuelle agriculture de  subsistance  en  ~griculture 
de  marche.  Le  renforcement  du  systeme  nutritiorinel  permettra de  m1eux 
analyser  Le  probleme  de  l'equilibre quantitatif  et·q~alitatif de  la 
balance  alimentaire  et  d'orienter  les mesures  prevues  ou  a prevoir a 
cet  egard.  Tandis  que  l'inventaire  du  capital  sol  fournira  les elements 
pour  une  meilleure planification a long  terme  de  l'occupation et  de 
l'exploitation  des  ~ols,  L'introduction des  fertilisants s'inscrit 
dans  La  perspective  du  passage  des  modes  de  production  actuels a une 
production  intensive,  en  complement  a  d'autres approches telles que 
L'integration elevage-agriculture. 
B.  Programme  Indicatif 
Comme  deja  communique  dans  l'etat d'avancement  n°  2  Cmai  1984), 
3  MECU  sont  reserv~s a l'appui  direct a  La  strate~ie· ~limentaire dans 
le  volet  "developpement  rural"  du  Programme  indicatif  reamenage·  Verne 
FED. 
Le  Gouvernement  veut  se  do~~r d'un  program~e de  d~veloppement de  La 
product icn  rle  ble  compte  lEt  ..  J  de  L 
1 importance 'de  cette  culture  avant 
L'ind~pendance ainsi  que  d~s develoopements  recents  de  certa~nes 
varietes  de  bles. 
Un~ premi~re operation  dans  ce  sens  concue  au  niveau  du  Groupe  euro-
rwandais  au.mo;s  de  mars,  est  en  phase  de  mise  au  point.  Compte  tenu 
des  delais d'instruction  et  de  mise  en  oeuvre  d'une  part  et  de  La 
nature  du  projet  d'autre  part,  le  Gouvernement  a  prefere en  demander 
le  financement  sur  le  poste  du  P.I.  mentionne  ci-avant. 
C.  Conclusion 
L'envelopce  financi~re que  La  Commission  entend  mettr~ en  ~ppui  d~rect 
~  La  strategie  ~limentaire s'eleve done  h  10  MECU  y  inclus  l~s 4  ~ECU 
'deja  engages  sur  le  budget  83.  L'engagement  des  autres, credits pro-
grammes  est  pr~vu entre  fin  84  et  mi-85.  ' 
Neanmoins,  les  besoins  financiers  de  La  strategie  alimentaire  depassant 
largement  les possibilites d'intervention  de  la  Commission,  le  Gou-
vernement  rwandais  a  sollicite  L'appui  concret  d'autres donateurs, 
notamment  celui  des  Etats  membres. 
[II.  La  coordination  entre  La  Commission,  les  Etats  Me~bres et  d 1autres 
donateurs  -
La  coordination  entre  La  Commission  et  Les  Etats  membres  qui  soutiennent 
La  strategie alirnentair·e  au  Rwanda,  a  ete  renforcee  au  nivea~ operationne.l, 
comnlementairement  ~  cPll~ qui  se  fait~ Kigali  notamment  au  sein  d~ 
Groupe  euro-rwandais. 
. I. -bL-
Dans  Le  cadre  de  La  cooperation  bilaterale, des  entretiens a tres 
haut  niveau  poLitique  ont  eu  lieu entre  Le  Gouvernement  rwandais  et 
ces  Etats  membres.  C'est  ainsi  que  l'appui  des  Etats  membres  se · 
concretise en  phase  de  programmation  de  l'aide par  La  prise en  compte 
des  orientations de  La  strategie alimentaire.  En  fonction  des  diffe-
rents etats d'avancement  des  pr-ogrammations  bilaterales,  l'appui[ a 
La  strategie  alimentaire  a  ete  inscrit  dans  certains  programmes  et 
des  actions  de  soutien a sa  mise  en  oeuvre  ont  deja  pu  etre  identifiees. 
D'autre part,  le  finar.cernent  du  schema  directeur  des  agro-industries 
<voir  II.A.3.  actions prioritaires)  est  prevu  sur  le  fonds  d'etude de 
La  Banque  mondiale  et  d'apres  les  informations  recues  Le  lancement  de 
cette action parait  proche. 
IV.  Les  aspects operationnels  de_  La  mise  en  oeuvre  de  la strategie  al~mentaire 
Les  actions  financees  au  titre du  "Programme  special· de  Lutte  contre  La 
faim  dans  le  monde"  sur  les  ressources du  budget  1983  sont  desormais 
bien  Lancees,  apres  des  delais administratifs plus  longs  que  prevu, 
intervenus pour  l'etabLissement  du  Protocole d'accord entre  La  Commission 
et  le Rwanda.  Grace  aux  tra\-aux  preparatoires menes  entre-temps,  les 
marches  principaux  de  travaux  et  fournitures  (construction  des  comp-
toirs de  l'OPROVIA,  fourniture d'intrants)  ont  ete  adjuges.  Des  tors, 
L'achevement  des  constructions et  les  livraisons  sont  prevusaucours 
des  mois  _prochai~s.  L'~ssistance technique  prevue  pour  l'action d'in-
troduction  des  fertitisant3 est  ~n  cours  de  mise  en  place. ZAMBIA 
1.  Zambia's  feed  and  agriculture  strategy  is  incorporated  ~n 
the  documents  tabled  at  the  World  Bank  Consultative  mee~ing 
(Paris  22-24  May).  These  documents  draw  on  and  incorporate 
much  of  the  material  discussed  and  agreed  between  GRZ  and 
EEC  representatives  in  t~e  Zambia-EEC  Joint  Committee,  as 
well  ijS  the  Netherlands  financed  'Food  Strategy'  report. 
However,  this  strateg;  statement  still has  not  reached  beyond 
the  stage  of  policy orientation  and  global  expenditure 
figures.  The  e~ement  of  specific  action  has  not  yet  been 
defined. 
2.  In  some  aspects  how~~er,  GRZ  has  already  taken  concrete 
acti~ tc  implement  the  strategies ·to  which  it  is 
committed.  T~e  most  important  elements  in  recent  Government 
decisions  are: 
a.  regular  increases  in  producer prices  to  ensure  that 
.prices  remain  attractive  to  producers; 
b.  devaLuation/floatin~ of  the  Kwacha  to  ensure  that  in 
pa:·ticu~ar  i~ported inputs  are  casted  realistically; 
c.  removal  of  transport  subsidies  as  a  step  towards 
reyional  pricing; 
d.  drafting  (still  at  a  preliminary  stage)  of  a  5  year 
reeLing  investme~t  plan  for  Food  and  Agriculture  which 
wiLl  set  the  prior1ties  ~ithin which  individual 
projects  are  appraised; 
and  Rese~rch'. 
• • . I . .. 3.  GRZ's  capacity-to  implement  any  programme  of  concrete 
action  continues  to deteriorate  in  Line  with  the 
deterioration  of  the  overall  economic  situation. 
4.  GRZ's  intention  to  merge  the  Zambia-EEC  Joint  Committee 
into  the  'Joint  Monitoring  Committee'  agreed  in  Paris  in 
.  *  the  context  of  the  ~orld Bank  Consultative  Group. 
The  JMC's  precise  role  remains  to  be  agreed  with  donors 
(in  practice  it did  not  prove  possible  in  the  EEC-GRZ 
Joint·Committee  to  prepare  projects  for  submission  for 
finance;  it  is  not  cLear  whether  this  function  will  be 
exercised  in  the  JMCI. 
5.  In  order  not  to dela)l  ''~:-ther· the  implementation of  the 
Indicative  Progra~me,  !t  was  agreed  in  earl~  198~ 
<between  GRZ  and  Delegation,  approved  by  Commission 
services>  to  press  ahead  with  the  commitment  of  funds  for 
projects  in  the  broad  !  ~"•  of  Zambia's  strategy 
objectives,  e.~.: 
i  .  Storage  5  MECU  <Japanese  Aid  also 
contributing 
:  ·5  MECU  project> 
ii.  Croo  diversi_f,ca_!~-~ <sorghum,  millet,  cassava> 
5  MECU 
ii•,  e~tension  ser~·ces  !oxen  a~a~n  ~o~er) 
2  "'ECl; 
This  work  is  now  progre~~ing.  As  for  storage,  delegation 
awaits  t~e  results  of  3  GTZ  study  on  storage  requirements 
<to  be  made  available  before  end  1984>  before  launching  its 
own  ideas.  GRZ's  request  has  not  yet  been  tabled. 
Imple~entation timetable:  financial  proposal  - mid  85  Cloan>; 
EDF  Committee  - end  1985;  Loan  agreement  - mid  1986. 
A5  to  crop  diversification  and  extension  services,  two 
~-~ibility _stud·!e_~ are  in  the  process  of being  Launched. 
• • • I •.• 
An  inaugural  meeting  tcok  place  on  8  August 2.1U.1984 
TANZANIA .. 
1. Tanzanian Government  pol'c}ies  on  agriculture were  set out  in  th~ 
course  of  1983,  particularly  in  the  White  Paper  produced ·by  the.· 
Ministry of  Agricultur~ on  be~alf of ~he Government~  This  re~af~irmed 
that  the main  emphasis  in  food  production  would  remain  on  the  smallholder 
level,  but  two  other  modes  of  production  (namely  the  parastatals  and  .  .  . 
the  pr~vate commercial  sector)  were  endorsed. by  the  Government,· and  woulc · 
be  encouraged.  The  Government  recognises  the  need  to provide  a··fair 
price  to  the  farmer,  and  the  importance of  an  adequate· supply  of 
consumer  goods  as  part  of  an  incentive  package  to  reverse  the  trend of 
falling  prodLiction.  Input  supply  is also  a  critical element  in -increa-
·sing  production. 
2.  On  food  crop  marketing,  the  Sovernment  recognises  four  main  chann~ls­
the  traditional  ~lr~et,  the  ~ooperatives,  the .fobd  marketing  board, 
and  sales or  purchases  di~ect  by  ot~er institutions. 
3.  A National  Food  s~~ategy  R~u~-t, prepared  by  an  FAO  Food  Strateg~ team 
financed  by  DA~Jl.)A,  >~as  pre;~nted to  th1 e  Tanzanian .Government  in  1982 
and  formed  part  of  the  background  t.)  the  policy  rev}ew  outlined  a,bove. 
The  budget  oresented  tb  t~e  Assembly  ~"  June  1984  begins  the  imple-
mentation  of  some  of  t~e rew  ~olicy ;  an  inc~eased share of  agri,ulture 
i~ Government  e•oenditure,  higher  prices  in  real  terms  for  producers 
<although  sti,ll  well  beLow  the  levels of  10  years  ago  in  real  terms> 
and  tighter  controls  on  parastatals all  figure prominently. 
4.  The  EEC  has  offered  supoort  fer  a  Tanzanian  Food  Strategy but  there is 
much  pretiMi~ary work  to  ~~  done. 
i 
The  Com'l't.~n'tt  •.as  agree:i  t·j  ;)rc;v_pde  tao  experts  i~  p~annfng in  the .food 
sector  to assist  wit,  this  ~ork. 
Meanwhile  assistance  is also  being  provided  through 
support  ~nder the  Indicative.Programme  for  oxenisation and  increased 
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crop  production  in  Iringa  region,  for  increased quality and  quantity 
of  coffee output  (Tanzania's  main  export  crop),  and  for  the  study 
of  pests affecting  banana  production •.  ECU  3.9 million  has be'n 
I 
allocated  from  article.958 of-the Community  budget  in 1983  and  1984  f(:)r 
special  projects  to  combat  hunger,  including  the  supply of materials 
for  making  farm  implements,  of  insectic~des and  of  feriilisers, 
a  pilot project  in  Tanga  Region  on  environmental  conservation and. 
agricultural  development,  and  a  olant  to produce  fuel  bricks from 
coffee milling  wastes  in  order  to  save  scarce  woodfuel.  Total  Stabex 
payments  to  Tanzania  stand  at  ECU  27.65  ~illion, mainly  in  respect 
of  sisal  (68-·X>.-
In  1983,  food  aid  from  the  European  Community  to  Tanzania  consisted: 
of  20,000  tonnes of  cereals,  1,600 tonrtes  of  milk  powder  and  400 
tonnes  of  butthroi l.  In  additi!O'n;  4,0·::10  tonnes  of  maize  was 
provided as  emergency  assistance  in  1984. 